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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the cashback mechanism on online merchants’ 
affiliate and pricing strategies. Through reimbursing a portion of the transactional 
amount to consumers in a form of cashback, merchants are able to practice second-
degree price discrimination. We develop an analytical framework which explicitly 
considers the implementation cost associated with the underlying promotional vehicle. 
We first identify the conditions under which affiliate strategy is profitable. Surprisingly, 
the promotional “low” price could be actually “high”, relative to the uniform price when 
cashback is absent. We also propose channel coordination as a remedy to mitigate 
market inefficiency caused by double marginalization. Finally, we extend our model to a 
duopoly setting and find that a merchant can benefit from its rival’s move into the 
cashback market. Under some conditions both merchants have no incentive to move 
alone but prefer its rival to do so. 
Keywords:  cashback, online advertising, promotion, price discrimination, duopoly 
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Introduction 
The rise of the Internet and the surging popularity of online shopping have offered rapid growth in e-
commerce and garnished companies’ interest around adapting best digital marketing strategies. 
Specifically, affiliate marketing, an Internet-based advertising where a business pays the affiliates for 
every visitor or sale brought in by the affiliates’ own effort, has become a prevalent strategy for online 
businesses to boost sales volume at low costs (Swan 2011b). In the early days of e-commerce, companies 
relied on web traffic to establish popularity; now the attention has turned to converting such traffic into 
actual purchases. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of affiliate type among top 20 sales-generating websites in the United 
Kingdom from 2006 to 2012 (Swan 2011a). The statistics highlight a dynamic shift in online advertising 
practice, moving from ordinary methods such as pay-per-click (PPC) to the novel cashback affiliate. Over 
the years, cashback affiliate model – which incentivizes consumers to purchase by reimbursing them with 
a portion of transactional amount – has received substantial acceptance among online merchants1 due to 
its capability of converting traffic into sales. Such higher conversion rates stem from an interesting online 
shopping behavior noted in Forbes: “One good way to find deals is to find the cheapest price … and then 
check at Ebates.com to see if there’s a cashback offered for the merchant you found” (Rand 2005). 
Table 1. Breakdown of Affiliate Type among Top 20 Sales-generating Websites 
Affiliate Method 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
PPC 13 14 9 7 5 2 3 
Coupon code 0 0 3 3 3 5 3 
Cashback 2 2 2 4 5 6 7 
Content/Others 5 4 6 6 7 7 6 
Websites built simply upon the cashback concept, such as Ebates.com and MrRebates.com, are extremely 
successful. Ebates, the leading cashback site in the U.S. with 12 million registered users, has reimbursed 
over 85 million dollars to its members since 1998. In 2011 it brokered 900 million dollars in merchandise 
sales for its 1,600 affiliated merchants. Its revenue growth has trended 50 percent higher for the second 
year in a row since 2010 (Hoge 2011). Interestingly, cashback sites are not the only ones trying to exploit 
this new marketing concept. Software giant Microsoft in 2008 implemented the cashback feature that 
allows its search engine Bing to act as a cashback publisher. One year later, Google also introduced its 
Google Checkout as a platform on rewarding customers.  
There is every reason to believe the cashback concept will continue to grow its popularity. Major 
consumer banks in the U.S. gradually roll out cashback feature to their online shopping channels2, such as 
Ultimate Reward Mall (Chase Bank), ThankYou Bonus Center (Citibank), and Add It Up Program (Bank 
of America). Bank of America in August 2012 further leveraged the cashback concept by launching 
BankAmeriDeals, an innovative program that allows consumers to earn cashback from shopping at 
physical stores. It has become clear that cashback concept is a catalyst for collaboration between 
merchants and their affiliate partners, and the enabler for a level of interaction between customers and 
merchants that has not been possible until now. 
                                                             
1  By online merchants we mean manufacturers and retailers in both click-and-mortar and online-only business 
models. 
2  Credit card issuers commonly reward “cash back” to card holders when they make payments by cards; however it 
is different from the “cashback” as discussed in this paper in two aspects. First, the former merely incentivizes card 
holders to use the cards whereas the latter further allows merchants to price-discriminate among consumers. Second, 
card issuers run the reward programs and dictate cash back percentages without taking merchants’ interest into 
account. In our cashback model, however, merchants will decide whether to affiliate with intermediaries, and that 
given an affiliation is formed, cashback rates are then determined through a process in which both merchants and 
intermediaries are involved.  
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Practice and Problem 
The cashback affiliate is a novel marketing approach featuring both online advertising and digital 
promotion. Once affiliating with a cashback intermediary, a merchant (advertiser) 3 can post an “affiliate 
link” on the publisher’s site. This hyperlink re-directs consumers to the merchant’s online storefront 
where purchasing transactions are taken place. The cashback intermediary (publisher), as a transaction 
broker, collects a commission from a merchant when consumers make transactions through the referral 
link. It then entices consumers into purchasing by rewarding them with a predetermined portion of the 
transactional amount, also known as cashback. 4  This monetary incentive to consumers makes the 
cashback affiliate one of the most effective advertising approaches. 
The cashback model is also a promotional vehicle which allows the merchant to pursue segmentation by 
price-discriminating among consumers. Products can be listed for one price for non-cashback users and a 
lower price for the cashback users at the same time. In practice, cashback holds advantages over others 
alternatives such as coupons and mail-in rebates in two aspects. First, from a consumer’s perspective, this 
concept is straightforward. Searching for coupons or coupon codes could be time-consuming and the 
promotions are redeemable under some terms and conditions only (e.g., prior to expiration date). The 
redemption cost associated with mail-in rebates is state-dependent and is thus uncertain to consumers 
(Lu and Moorthy 2007). Cashback on the contrary has the capability of providing constant and certain 
discount. Second, from a merchant’s perspective, the cashback practice is simple yet efficient. Companies 
seek outside marketing solution like affiliate marketing because they are struggling to reach desired 
consumer segments by themselves. Take coupon for example. According to NCH Marketing Services, in 
2012, coupon redemption rate is as low as 3.5% in the United States. This low figure exhibits the 
inefficiency concern about traditional mass-media promotion. Cashback sites, with a huge loyal user base, 
provide an efficient solution for targeting promotion. 
Despite its prevalence in the practice, the cashback affiliate model has received almost no attention from 
researchers. Motivated by the lack of theoretical examination on this still-nascent marketing approach, we 
develop an analytical framework to fully understand the strategic use of the cashback affiliate model. In 
this paper, we are interested in answering the following questions:  
 When should a merchant adopt the cashback model? 
 Given a merchant affiliates with the publisher, how should they set their respective pricing terms? 
 How would the introduction of cashback impact consumer surplus and social welfare? 
Literature Review  
Literature on price discrimination provides the theoretical fundamental for our research framework. Price 
discrimination is only feasible when three conditions are met: (i) sellers have market power, (ii) arbitrage 
is infeasible, and (iii) buyers differ in their demands for a good or service and they can be segmented 
either directly or indirectly (Stole 2007; Varian 1989). Several analytical models are developed to examine 
the rationale of price dispersion (Salop and Stiglitz 1982; Shilony 1977; Varian 1980). Price discrimination 
is commonly thought as a weapon for firms to make extra profit.5 However, based on experiences with 
several major firms, Neslin and Shoemaker (1983) argue that most managers do not have good methods 
                                                             
3  While practitioners call businesses who have adopted advertising models advertisers, it is more appropriate to 
use a more general term merchants instead of advertisers since in this paper we examine whether businesses should 
adopt the underlying model. 
4  To earn cashback, a consumer needs to: (1) register for membership at a cashback site, (2) click on a merchant’s 
referral link which will direct the shopper’s browser to the merchant’s own website, and (3) make a purchase. 
Accumulated cashback can be claimed via checks or Paypal online transfers. Some sites (e.g., MrRebates.com) 
provide price-comparison feature and merchant-specific coupon codes which allow consumers to obtain a bigger 
discount. 
5  Strictly speaking, two more premises are required to make this argument valid. First, the merchant’s 
segmentation strategy should be effective, i.e. charging right prices to right types of consumers. Second, 
and perhaps the more importantly, the revenue gain of doing such practice should be greater than the cost 
incurred. Most of the extant analyses on price discrimination neglect these two important factors. 
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for computing the overall profitability of a proposed promotion program. Anderson and Dana (2009) 
develop a monopoly pricing model and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is 
profitable. 
The stream of research investigating promotional vehicles in monopoly is most related to this work. 
Narasimhan (1984) demonstrates that coupon users are different from nonusers. Since then, a variety of 
promotional methods are developed by marketers and investigated by researchers. For example, coupons 
take various formats such as direct mail coupons (e.g., Bawa and Shoemaker 1987), newspaper coupons 
(e.g., Neslin 1990), package coupons (e.g., Raju et al. 1994), cross-ruff coupons (e.g., Dhar and Raju 1998), 
and digitalized coupons (Oliver and Shor 2003). Researchers are also interested in key factors that 
influence a firm’s choice among different alternatives. For example, a promotional vehicle’s expiration 
date (long- vs. short-duration) and redemption timing (front-loaded vs. rear-loaded) also determines its 
probability (Inman and McAlister 1994; Krishna and Zhang 1999; Zhang et al. 2000). Promotional 
vehicles are also used to meet different business objectives. Gerstner and Hess (1991) argue that the 
manufacturer can motivate retail participation by using rebates. Firms can also incorporate promotion 
into pricing strategy for better customer retention (Shin and Sudhir 2010). 
This paper is also related to ones focusing on the role of promotional methods in an oligopolistic setting. 
Shaffer and Zhang (1995) consider a market in which two competing firms can distribute coupons either 
to targeted consumers or via mass media. They demonstrate that coupon targeting leads to a prisoner’s 
dilemma which makes both firms worse off. Corts (1998) find similar result by demonstrating that 
competing firms may wish to refrain from price discrimination. A relevant search question is also 
explored in a more general setting with two asymmetric firms. Lal (1990) and Rao (1991) conclude that in 
equilibrium national brands should promote to mitigate encroachment by a private label. Dogan et al. 
(2010), on the other hand, find that if one firm has absolute competitive advantage over its rival, in the 
equilibrium the disadvantaged firm would offer rebates alone.  
Although the volume of extant research on promotion is vast, our work contributes to the literature in the 
following aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one directly studying the still-
nascent cashback model and examining the strategic use of such unique promotional method. Second, we 
explicitly consider the implementation costs associated with the underlying model, which are treated 
exogenous in most, if not all, of prior literature on promotion methods. Third, our stylized model 
endogenizes the prices of advertised products as a decision variable of merchants’ profit function, which 
are commonly assumed to be given exogenously in the advertising literature.6 These analytical advantages 
provide a sharper and more conclusive insight into the merchant’s best affiliate and pricing strategy.  
Basic Model  
In this section, we first introduce the consumer response, consumer segments, and the merchant’s pricing 
alternatives, when the cashback affiliate is absent. The preliminaries developed from non-cashback 
pricing serve as a benchmark for our analysis of the cashback mechanism. Next, we set up the cashback 
pricing model and derive optimal pricing decisions at equilibrium. 
Non-Cashback Pricing – A Benchmark 
Consumer response. In the spirit of Salop’s model (1979), we assume that consumers are uniformly 
distributed on a preference line.7 The location of a consumer identifies the ideal bundle of product 
attributes she prefers. The reservation price a consumer would like to pay for her ideal product is V. A 
product at distance x away from the consumers generates a utility of V – tx, where t measures consumers’ 
sensitivity to horizontal product preference. After accounting for the price effect, consumers with location 
x away from the product derive a transaction utility of U(x) = V – p – tx. Each consumer has a unitary 
demand and will buy the product if the transaction utility is non-negative. As a result, the demand can be 
                                                             
6 Few exceptions are Dellarocas (2012), Chen and He (2011), and Feng and Xie (2007) 
7  Since our research interest is in merchants’ pricing strategy rather than product positioning, Salop’s model allows 
us to ignore firm’s location decisions, which is a common concern in IS spatial model literature (see Dewan et al 2003 
for example). 
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expressed by ( ) 2( ) /Q p V p t  . 
Consumer segments. Consider a market with total number of consumers normalized to one. The market is 
composed of two types of consumers, l and h, with fraction θ and 1θ, respectively. For a given product, 
type-h consumers have a reservation price v, whereas type-l consumers have a lower reservation price δv, 
where δ (0,  1) 8. When type-l’s relative valuation is low, (i.e., δ is small) we say the valuation difference 
between two consumer types is salient. Given the model setting, the demand generated from type-l and 
type-h segments are ( ) 2( ) /lQ p v p t     and ( ) (1 ) 2( ) /hQ p v p t    , respectively. Throughout this 
paper we consider the market diverse enough and hence exclude the case where market is fully covered.9 
The market configuration, measured by (θ, δ), plays an important role in determining firms’ pricing 
strategy, as we shall see shortly. 
 
Figure 1. Consumer Segments and Response 
Merchant’s pricing problem. Consider a market served by a monopolist. With the simplest pricing 
scheme, the merchant may charge a uniform price 
up , to the entire market and face a simple pricing 
problem given by:  
  ( ) ( )
u
m u l u u h u
p
Umax p Q p p Q p      . (1) 
Maximizing Equation (1) we have the optimal uniform price, 
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The optimal uniform price is dependent of market configuration. When market parameters ( , )  fall in 
the region
HR , the merchant would set the price at / 2v  and serve type-h consumers only. When
( , ) HR   , it has incentive to serve both segments and charge one half of the total market valuation.  
Now assume the monopolist can accurately identify consumers’ type with no cost. The merchant may 
want to price-discriminate consumers by charging two asymmetric prices: a low price 
lp , to the low type 
and a high price 
hp , to the high type. As a result, the merchant’s profit maximization problem with 
discriminating pricing is given by: 
 
, 
 ( ) ( )
l h
m l l l h h h
p p
Dmax p Q p p Q p     , (2) 
The asymmetric prices allow the merchant to separately maximize its profit in two different segments. 
                                                             
8  The setting of asymmetric reservation price is widely adopted in marketing and economic literature on price 
discrimination. See Lu and Moorthy (2007) and Desai (2001) for example. 
9  We have such model restriction for two reasons. First, since the main focus of this paper is the effect of price on 
product sales, we find it unrealistic to assume that product sales remains the same (market is covered) when price 
changes. Second, when market is covered, the publisher’s decision could be restrained to the corner solution.  
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Maximizing Equation (2) gives the optimal asymmetric prices * / 2lp v  and
* / 2hp v . Comparing pricing 
terms under two different schemes yields the following observations. 
LEMMA 1. (i) The optimal pricing terms follow the pattern: * * *l u hp p p  ; (ii) The ability to price 
discriminate makes the merchant better off, i.e. m m
D U  . All inequalities hold regardless of market 
configuration.  
In the absence of cashback, when a firm switches from uniform to discriminating pricing, it lowers the 
price for type-l segment while raises the price for the other. In other words, the uniform price is bound 
between two asymmetric prices. In addition, discriminating pricing is always preferred if a merchant can 
identify consumers’ type without any cost. Given these observations, we ask: Do these arguments still hold 
in the presence of cashback model?  
Cashback Model 
Since reservation price is asymmetric across segments, the merchant has incentive to charge different 
prices to different segments. However, it cannot not directly distinguish different types of consumers. 
Cashback, a mechanism which allows consumers to self-select themselves into correct types, can serve as 
a price discrimination device. Although the majority of online advertising literature assumes the price of 
advertised products to be exogenous, we think it is more realistic to endogenize the price decision into 
firms’ profit maximization problem. In our analytical framework, the merchant first decides whether or 
not to adopt cashback affiliate and subsequently sets the prices. For exposition purpose, our analysis 
proceeds in the reverse direction. We first analyze firm’s optimal prices given the affiliation is formed. 
Then we examine whether the merchant should adopt the affiliate model at all. 
A merchant who adopts cashback affiliate is actually operating an electronic dual-channel. When a 
consumer desires to buy a certain product, she could purchase it directly from the merchant’s e-commerce 
website (direct channel10) or via the affiliate link on a cashback site (cashback channel). Of course, 
cashback shopping is not costless to consumers. Cashback shoppers incur transaction costs that include 
the disutility derived from extra works throughout cashback shopping process such as registering on the 
publisher, searching for the merchants, clicking through affiliate links, and waiting for rewards to be 
redeemable11. Nevertheless, a consumer would still choose to shop through the cashback channel if the 
monetary incentive obtained from cashback is greater than the transaction costs. In the case where 
transaction costs are perceived to be higher, the consumer is assumed to make the purchase via the direct 
channel. 
Denoting the transaction costs incurred from cashback shopping by 
ic  (i = l, h), and since the values of 
time are different across segments, we assume that the costs are lower for type-l consumers, i.e. l hc c . 
The assumption that transaction cost is positively correlated with the reservation price is widely accepted 
in the prior literature (Coughlan and Soberman 2005). Without the loss of generality, we normalize 
lc  to 
zero. This normalization is justifiable in the following senses. From a consumers’ perspective, cashback 
shoppers are a group of consumers who value saving beyond the time associated with getting discounts 
(Swan 2010). From an analytical perspective, the incentive for price discrimination still holds even if 
0lc  , as long as l hc c  (Gerstner et al. 1994).  
Consumers self-select whether to pay a regular price
rp , or a lower post-cashback price
12
pp , depending on 
whether they participate on the cashback site. The relative magnitude between one’s transaction cost 
ic , 
and the incentive obtained from cashback shopping, p (defined as r pp p p   ), determine the self-
selection outcome (Figure 2). 
                                                             
10  By the direct channel we mean a merchant’s e-commerce storefront, while the term can be generalized to include 
the merchant’s physical stores. 
11  It usually takes 30-60 days for the rewards to be available for redemption. 
12  The post-cashback price is an ex post one perceived by consumers after factoring in with the cashback rewards. 
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Figure 2. Consumer’s Self-selecting Mechanism via an Electronic Dual-channel 
To best model the current cashback practice, we consider a three-stage Stackelberg game with two players: 
a merchant and a cashback site. Unless otherwise indicated, we use the site and the publisher 
interchangeably. In the first stage, the merchant decides whether or not to affiliate with the cashback site. 
If the affiliation is formed, the merchant then chooses a regular price pr and a commission rate b ( [0,1]b ) 
in the second stage. From the merchant’s perspective, this commission can be considered the cost to pay 
for being able to price-discriminate. In the last stage, the intermediary site makes b times the sales 
revenue it brokers. Meanwhile it chooses a cashback rate a ( [0, ]a b ), and rewards publisher users with a 
times transactional amount in a form of cashback. The site incurs a zero marginal cost since it merely 
operates as an intermediary and does not directly deal with transactions (see Section 1.1 for industry 
practice). The merchant’s marginal cost is assumed constant and can be normalized to zero by 
interpreting consumers’ reservation price as net of marginal cost. Two firms work independently13 and 
maximize their respective profits: 
 
, 
(1 ) ( ) ( )
r
m r
C
l p r h r
p b
max p b Q p p Q p      , (3) 
 ( ) ( )p r l p
a
max p b a Q p    , (4) 
where pp = pr∙(1-a). The superscript C on π indicates cashback pricing and subscriptions m and p denote 
the merchant and the publisher (or, the cashback site), respectively.  
For the cashback model to work as a price discrimination device, consumers’ incentive compatibility (IC) 
constraints must be satisfied. 14  Critical readers may argue that the merchant’s desire to sort out 
consumers is not necessarily aligned with the site’s best interest, in that the site may have incentive entice 
also type-h consumers by setting a higher cashback rate. In fact, this would never happen in practice. 
Once both consumer types become cashback shoppers, all consumers would pick the cashback channel 
and pay the lower price and therefore nominal asymmetric prices actually work as a uniform price. The 
merchant’s net profit, defined as sales revenue subtracted by commission, is strictly less than the level 
that can be achieved by the optimal uniform price. If this were the case, the merchant would rather simply 
set a uniform price and leave the site, which ends up making a zero profit without commission. Such 
credible threat tightly aligns the interests of two affiliate partners under the cashback pricing model. 
Pricing Decision 
Maximizing (2) and solving (3) and (4) using backwards induction gives two firms’ optimal pricing terms. 
LEMMA 2. When adopting cashback pricing model, the merchant sets regular price *
2
r
v
p  , and 
                                                             
13  To understand the cashback industry we conducted an interview with the president at a major cashback site in 
the U.S. Per interview minutes, merchants in practice have no control over the publisher’s choice on cashback rate. 
14  Consumers’ IC constraint is 
0 .
h
p c  
 If h
c
is too small such that the interior solution doesn’t exist, then we 
would end up with the corner solution / .
h r
a c p  The merchant’s profit-maximization problem degenerates to a 
simple case with only one decision variable p. This scenario deviates from the main interest of this study, and hence 
we focus on the interior solutions for the rest of this paper. 
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commission rate * 1 .b    The cashback site chooses cashback rate *
3
1
2
a   .  
With cashback mechanism operating as a price-discrimination device, the merchant is able to charge 
asymmetric prices across segments. It now can extract the highest surplus from type-h consumers by 
increasing the price from *up  to 
*
hp . Such price hike is consistent with the second inequality presented in 
Lemma 1 (i.e. * *u hp p ). Following the first inequality of the same pattern (i.e. 
* *
p up p ), one may expect 
the post-cashback price for type-l consumers *pp , to be lower than the uniform level. However, our 
common intuition is not always the case in the presence of cashback mechanism. 
PROPOSITION 1. The “cashback paradox”, where post-cashback price is higher than the uniform price, 
will happen as long as market configuration falls in the region 
1
 ( , )  ,  
2
XR      
 
    
 
,  
where 
2
1 2 1
,  0 ;
3(1 )
2 3 1 1
,  ,
2 2 3 2
if
if








  
 
  
 
 and 
2
2
1
2(1 )



 

. 
From consumers’ perspective Proposition 1 indicates a shocking result. Cashback shopping provides an 
attractive saving opportunity for bargain hunters as the prices they pay are perceived lower. Surprisingly, 
under some conditions the seemingly “low” post-cashback price is actually more expensive, relative to the 
uniform price in settings where price discrimination is absent. As a consequence, after the cashback 
promotion is implemented consumers regardless of their types end up facing a higher price (i.e.
* * *
r p up p p  ). 
 
Figure 3. Region for Promotional Price 
Paradox 
 
Figure 4. Asymmetric Prices vs. Uniform 
Price 
Figure 3 plots the market configuration region RX (on a θ-δ coordinate) in which the cashback paradox 
will occur. What is the driving force behind such counterintuitive result? Recall From Lemma 1 that the 
optimal uniform price 
*
up , is bound between 
*
lp  and 
*
hp . Figure 4 illustrates various optimal prices as a 
function of θ.15 Clearly, when θ=0, * *u hp p  as all consumers are high type; when θ=1, 
* *
u lp p  as all 
consumers are low type. In the current industry practice, the merchant exerts no control over the site’s 
choice of commission rate. The ability to set commission rate a allows the site to seek its own highest 
profit margin. This pricing structure is an analogy to a traditional supply chain setting (Dellarocas 2012) 
where the manufacturer and the retailer independently choose their respective prices. The upward price 
                                                             
15    For presentation purpose,    
  and   
  are truncated at      since beyond this point the merchant will switch back 
to the uniform pricing. Details on affiliate decision will be discussed in the next subsection. The figure is plotted with 
δ=0.4. 
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distortion stems from double marginalization raises the price targeted at type-l consumers from *lp  to 
*
pp . 
Interestingly enough, when θ lies in the interval [ ,  ]  , the merchant can still make a higher net profit by 
simultaneously increasing two asymmetric prices, compared to the highest profit that can be achieved by 
a uniform price. The explanation to this counterintuitive result is given as follows. When the merchant has 
incentive to serve both segments, the optimal uniform price *up , is decreasing with the fraction of type-l 
consumers θ. If θ is sufficiently large (i.e.  ), the uniform price is relatively low, compared to the 
optimal price when only type-h segment is served. Under this condition cashback affiliation not only 
allows the merchant to extract the highest surplus from high-type consumers but also generates a positive 
net profit from low-type ones. It is worth noting that while we assume linear demand for simplicity, none 
of our analyses are dependent on this assumption.16 
Affiliate Decision 
When should the merchant affiliate with the cashback site? The subgame perfect equilibrium gives the 
answer. 
PROPOSITION 2. The merchant’s best affiliate decision
,         ( , ) ,
 , ,       
Paffiliating if R
D
not affiliating otherwise
  
 

  
where
2
2
 ( , )  1 ,  2 2 .
2(1 )
PR

     

  
       
  
 
We have shown (in Lemma 1) that discriminating pricing is always preferred to uniform pricing when 
price setter can discriminate consumers costlessly. Proposition 2 suggests that the merchant should adopt 
the cashback pricing model as long as market configuration falls in the profitable region, Rp. From a 
merchant’s perspective, the profitability of the underlying mechanism is determined by two components: 
(1) the revenue gain resulted from being able to price-discriminate and (2) the cost incurred in order to 
obtain such pricing weapon (i.e. the commission pays to the publisher). In what follows, we examine the 
effect of market parameters on the merchant’s affiliate decision. 
When the fraction of type-l consumer θ is fixed, the advantage of discriminating pricing over uniform 
pricing is diminishing in type-l’s valuation coefficient δ. If the valuation gap between two segments 
vanishes (δ=1), the optimal uniform price yields the highest profit. When δ is fixed, the fraction of type-l 
consumers, θ, moderates attractiveness of the cashback affiliate. A high value of θ implies more sales 
volume is generated via the cashback channel, and therefore the merchant pays a larger portion of its total 
revenue to the site. Combined, these two effects suggest that the cashback model is profitable if and only if 
θ and δ are sufficiently small. As (θ, δ) becomes smaller (larger), the market will shift towards (away from) 
the cashback model. We will use this principal to facilitate our subsequent discussion.  
Current cashback practice suffers from market efficiency loss caused by double marginalization. Arguing 
that two affiliate partners can split the profit through a bargaining process, we propose a potential 
solution to mitigate the undesirable outcome identified in our model.  
Cashback Coordination 
We have examined when and how the cashback model can be used as a price discrimination device. What 
remains unclear so far is the impact of the underlying mechanism on consumers as a whole and on the 
entire society. In this section, we first present a welfare analysis of the current cashback practice. Then, we 
propose an alternative approach to improve market inefficiency which stems from double marginalization.  
Our discussion on welfare proceeds in the following two cases. When (θ, δ)RH, the monopolist with 
uniform pricing would set pu=v/2 and serve the high-type only. In the presence of the cashback 
mechanism, the merchant can now set the same price pr=v/2 for type-h segment and meanwhile provides 
                                                             
16  The impact of double marginalization, including price distortion and welfare reduction, would be stronger if the 
marginal revenue curve is convex, since the publisher would try to get a bigger pie by setting a cashback rate further 
from the channel optimum. 
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a lower price pp for the other. In this case, the cashback practice possesses all the merits: it increases 
overall consumer surplus, sellers’ surplus and social welfare. When (θ, δ)  RH, however, the 
implementation of the current cashback practice leads to a reduction in overall consumer surplus and 
social welfare, compared to the level under uniform pricing. This reduction in both welfare measurements 
echoes prior literature (e.g., Schmalensee 1981) since the aggregate output decreases due to the upward 
price distortion. The affiliated merchant makes (1-θ)v2/2t from its direct channel and θ(δv)2/4t from the 
cashback channel. The intermediary site receives sales commission θ(δv)2/8t. Since each firm is able to 
set its own profit margin, two sellers’ joint profit, given by  2 24(1 ) 3 ( ) / 8v v t    , is below the joint 
optimum  2 2 / 2(1 ) ( )v tv   if the work as an integrated firm (Jeuland and Shugan 1983). In our 
research context, coordination between two affiliate partners in determining cashback rate is the most 
straightforward solution to this problem. In what follows, we identify conditions under which cashback 
coordination can be achieved through a bargaining mechanism. For distinction purpose, we call our 
proposed mechanism Coordinated Cashback, as opposite to the current cashback practice. 
Bargaining Process and Coordination 
We denote the cashback site’s and merchant’s bargaining power by φ and 1-φ, respectively. Following the 
prior literature, the values of bargaining parameters are exogenous and may depend on each party’s 
relative market power such as market value, brand image, etc. The merchant and the site (hereafter we 
call them sellers for brevity) bargain over the cashback rate. If bargaining fails, two firms resort to their 
outside options which are determined by market configuration. If revenue of the current cashback model 
is verifiable, two firms would play the Stackelberg pricing game. Otherwise, no affiliation would be formed 
and the site earns a zero profit. The sellers’ respective outside options, denoted by a superscript “O”, are 
given by:  
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In its simplest presentation, the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950) 17  is the solution ( ,  )c cp a  to 
maximize sellers’ joint profit: 
 
, 
 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
c c
I I I
p m c c l c c c h c
p a
max p a Q p a p Q p         , 
where I  denotes the sellers’ joint profit when two affiliate partners coordinate and work as an 
integrated firm. Following the split-the-difference rule (Muthoo 1999), two firms’ profits under 
coordination is allocated by (1 ) p
I
m
I I
m      and p
I
p
I    , respectively. 
The success of the bargaining process eliminates double marginalization by dropping the site’s choice of 
commission rate. Exogenous bargaining parameters serve to allocate the profit generated through the 
cashback channel. When φ is large, the site receives a big pie of Ip , making coordination less attractive 
to the merchant. When φ is small, the site would leave the bargaining table because of insufficient 
incentive. Therefore, we can expect that channel coordination can be achieved when the value of φ is 
bound between some critical numbers.  
PROPOSITION 3. There is an interval ˆ  for the cashback site’s bargaining power, such that both firms 
have incentive to coordinate and split the revenue by their relative bargaining power, where 
                                                             
17  We choose Nash bargaining solution over Rubinstein model because we assume each consumer’s demand is 
unitary and the cashback game is a static one-shot game. 
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  (5) 
Clearly, the interval ˆ  depends upon the market configuration. When ( , ) PR   , two firms have incentive 
to coordinate in choosing commission rate as long as the merchant’s bargaining advantage18 is moderate. 
When ( , ) .PR   , since the site’s outside option is zero ( 0
O
p  ), any positive value of φ can incentivize 
the site to coordinate. As a result, our proposed mechanism is sustainable as long as the publisher does 
not claim too much share of revenue generated from type-l consumers (i.e. φ is sufficiently small). Figure 
5(a) depicts the interval ˆ  as a function of δ (θ=0.5). 
Figure 5(b) illustrates the upper bound of ˆ  when ( , ) PR   . Since δ moderates attractiveness of price 
discrimination devices19, a large value of δ shrinks the interval ˆ . The value of θ has a similar impact, as 
shown in the same plot. The intuition is that it is harder to align two firms’ interest when market shifts 
away from discriminating pricing. When ( , ) PR   , however, neither δ nor θ has impact on ˆ . This is 
because the revenue of the current cashback model is verifiable and profit-sharing scheme is independent 
of market configuration. 
(a) Feasible region ˆ for coordination (b) Upper-bound of interval ˆ  
  
Figure 5. Coordination condition, ˆ , as a function of δ 
Welfare Improvement 
Now, we demonstrate how our proposed mechanism provides a more efficient approach to practice price 
discrimination. From sellers’ perspective, this alternative approach expands the cashback model’s 
profitable region by taking bargaining power into decision making process. The bargaining process 
ensures a win-win situation for both firms. As seen in Figure 6, while the current practice outperforms the 
uniform pricing when   , the success in bargaining makes both firms better off as long as   .20 
From buyers’ perspective, coordinated cashback increases consumer surplus by restoring the price 
targeted at low-type segment from *pp  to 
*
lp . The left panel of Figure 7 shows that consumer surplus 
under coordinated cashback (black solid lines) dominates the current practice (gray dashed lines). The 
cashback paradox will never occur under this profit-sharing scheme. Social welfare (SW) has an 
unambiguous increase (the right panel of Figure 7). The cashback coordination discussed in this section is 
different from coordination achieved by a profit-sharing contract in that the former is analyzed under a 
price-discrimination and dual-channel framework. 
                                                             
18  By construct, the merchant’s bargaining advantage is (1–φ) – φ = 1–2φ.  
19  A detailed discussion is given in previous section. 
20  We derive   by arranging the bottom line of Equation (5). The figures are plotted with θ=0.5 and φ=0.3.  
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Figure 6. Coordinated Cashback vs. Current Cashback 
 
  
Figure 7. Comparing Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare 
Optimal Pricing Strategy in Duopoly 
Based on a monopoly setting, we have identified unique properties of the cashback model. We now turn 
our attention to merchants’ pricing and affiliate decision in the presence of competition. In what follows, 
we base our analysis on a duopoly while our framework can be generalized to an oligopolistic setting. 
Duopoly setting. Consider a market served by two merchants (M1 and M2) who sell differentiated 
products. Motivated by Dogan et al. (2010), we consider the differentiation both horizontal and vertical. 
On one hand, products offered by different merchants have various combinations of attributes. Such 
horizontal difference is modeled in the following way: two competing merchants are located at two 
different positions on consumers’ preference horizon.21 Each merchant has its own brand valuation. 
Factors determining a merchant’s brand valuation could be its brand image, level of customer services, 
reputation, etc. We assume type-h consumers have brand valuation of vj for Mj whereas type-l consumers 
have brand valuation of δvj for Mj (j=1,2). Without the loss of generality, we assume v1 > v2 and we call M1 
a superior merchant.  
Denoting the distance between two merchants’ locations by d, we model the intensity of competition 
between merchants by the reciprocal of d. A smaller d represents a higher degree of competition. Figure 8 
illustrates type-h consumers’ transaction utility derived from two differentiated products. A consumer 
would prefer to purchase from the merchant who gives her a higher utility. Consumers located at the 
projection of the intersection of two inwards utility segments on the preference horizon are indifferent 
between buying from either merchant. Similarly, consumers located at the intersection of Mj‘s utility 
segment and preference horizon are indifferent between buying Mj’s product and not buying at all. 
                                                             
21  The reasons why we choose Salop’s model over Hotelling’s are given as follows. First, Salop’s model allows us to 
ignore firm’s location decisions, which is a common concern in marketing and IS spatial model literature (see Dewan 
et al. 2003 for example). Second, Salop’s model is more flexible in a sense that it can be easily extended to a multiple-
merchant case. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, Hotelling’s spatial model cannot model the publisher’s decision 
when the competition between merchants is present. This is because when market is fully covered, the publisher 
would have no decision to make.  
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Figure 8. Consumers’ Choice Over Differentiated Products (Type-h) 
To simplify notations, we move some notations to superscripts. In a general format, the merchant j’s 
profit maximization problem, conditional on its affiliate decision, are given by: 
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and the publisher’s problem is given by: 
 
1,2
)( ,  
j
r l p
p j j j j j jja
max p b a Q p p    
where pj denotes the price set by M-j and is dependent on M-j‘s affiliate decision. 
Optimal Pricing Decisions 
The fact that a merchant’s profit also depends on the rival’s affiliate decision adds extra difficulty to our 
duopolistic model. Since each firm has to decide whether or not to affiliate, there are four possible market 
outcomes: both merchants affiliate, M1 affiliates alone, M2 affiliates alone, and neither merchant affiliates. 
To derive the subgame perfect solutions, we first solve the thrid-stage publisher’s profit maximization 
problem, given that two merchants’ affiliate and pricing decisions are known. 
LEMMA 3-1. The optimal cashback rates  2* *1 ,a a  under the competitive market outcome are: 
 * * 1 1 2 21 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
,
2 4 2 4
,B B
b dt v b dt v
a
p
a
p
     
   
 
. 
The second-stage solutions suggest that the site’s optimal cashback rate is increasing with the commission 
rates chosen by the merchants. This finding is consistent with the cashback rates observed on a typical site. 
For example, merchants belong to magazine/book category usually give a high commission rate (up to 
50%) to the publisher, which in turn, assigns high cashback percentages to consumers. Having the 
solutions to the publisher’s problem, we now are able to derive the merchants’ best response in the second 
stage.22  
LEMMA 3-2. The merchant j’s optimal price and commission rate under the competitive cashback 
market where both merchants affiliate are: 
 
  1 2* * 1 2
1 1
1 2
1 17 317 3 7
, ,
35 17 3 7
B B
v vv v dt
p b
v v dt
    
  
   
;  
  2 1* * 2 1
2 2
2 1
1 17 317 3 7
, ,
35 17 3 7
B B
v vv v dt
p b
v v dt
    
  
   
. 
The comparative statics of the optimal pricing terms under the competitive cashback market are 
summarized in Table 2. We find that the effect of brand valuation on price p and that on commission b 
move in the same direction. If a merchant is able to enhance its brand valuation, i.e. vj is higher, it can 
                                                             
22  We only present the solutions under the competitive market in the main text of this paper. Complete solutions 
are available upon request. 
E-Business and Competitive Strategy  
14 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013  
charge a higher regular price and assign a higher commission rate to the publisher. The increase in 
commission rate will in turn lead to a higher cashback percentage. Interpreting the magnitude of bj as the 
attractiveness of cashback affiliate to a merchant j, we find that a merchant’s incentive to adopt cashback 
mechanism is increasing with its own brand valuation vj. This nature is helpful in explaining the market 
equilibrium derived in the next subsection. A merchant’s optimal price and incentive to affiliate decrease 
with the competitor’s brand valuation, v-j. Unlike brand valuation, the effects of market parameters on 
merchant’s pricing terms p and b move in the opposite directions. Recall that 1/d measures the 
competition intensity between merchants. In a highly competitive market where horizontal product 
differentiation is insignificant, i.e. 1/d is large, merchants would engage in a price war by cutting the price 
and taking a more aggressive price discrimination strategy (i.e. a larger bj). If consumers appreciate 
products attributes more than price, as modeled by a larger t, merchants would extract larger surplus by 
pushing the price upwards. If δ is larger, indicating the valuation asymmetry between two segments is 
small, i.e. we will expect that price asymmetry across channels goes down. 
Table 2. Comparative Statics of the Optimal Price and Commission Rate 
  Parameters 
  vj v-j 1/d t δ 
Decision 
 Variables 
pj          
bj           
Equilibrium of the Cashback Market  
Although we have solved for firms’ pricing decisions, the solutions themselves do not constitute 
equilibrium (Dogan et al. 2010). To derive equilibrium conditions we need to further verify that neither 
merchant has incentive to deviate from a particular solution set by changing its affiliate decisions. The 
procedure of deriving subgame perfect equilibrium requires solving an inequality system with multiple 
parameters. To circumvent the complexity of searching through a multidimensional space, we resort to 
numeric analysis. The following lemma provides an interesting finding in the presence of competition. 
LEMMA 4. When a merchant adopts cashback affiliate, this move would also benefit its competitor. 
For discussion purpose, consider a scenario where M1 moves to the cashback market given M2‘s strategy is 
fixed. According to the nature of price discrimination, M1‘s price for type-l segments would decrease in the 
most cases. Such price cut boosts M1’s sales volume but hurts M2’s. At the same time, M1 would increase 
the regular price; the price to pay here is to surrender some type-h market share to M2. As a result, M2 
would be better off if M1 lessens the price competition in the more profitable high-type segment.  
Now, we turn our attention to the conditions of market equilibrium. Recall that the attractiveness of the 
cashback model is decreasing with market parameters δ and θ. When the market configuration is strongly 
in favor of cashback mechanism, (i.e. close to the origin of the θ-δ coordinate), affiliating is a dominant 
strategy for both merchants. A duopolist would benefit not only from its own move into cashback market 
but also from its rival’s (Lemma 4). This win-win situation leads the market to a pure strategy equilibrium 
wherein both merchants affiliate and make the highest profit, compared to the profit they can achieve in 
any other equilibria. When the market configuration is against discriminating pricing (i.e. away from the 
origin of θ-δ coordinate), both merchants lean towards conservation in affiliate, leading the market to an 
equilibrium wherein neither merchant affiliates. What remains unclear so far is the outcome when the 
market configuration is weakly in favor of the pricing tool. Since the profitability of the cashback model 
become ambiguous, one may conjecture that the asymmetric equilibrium wherein one merchant affiliates 
alone will emerge. We formally state our finding in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4. When market configuration is weakly in favor of the cashback affiliate, at equilibrium 
market outcome depends on merchants’ valuation difference v , where 1 2.v v v    . 
1. If v  is small, both merchants have no incentive to affiliate alone but prefer its rival to do so. 
This unique characteristic leads the market to a hawk-dove game. 
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2. If v  is large, the cashback model is not profitable to the low-valuation merchant. At 
equilibrium only the high-valuation merchant would affiliate with the publisher. 
3. If 0v  , two merchants are identical and as a result asymmetric equilibrium doesn’t exist. 
If v is small, merchants would play an anti-coordination game in which it is mutually beneficial for 
duopolists to play opposite strategies: Mj would like to affiliate only if Mj does not; and Mj would prefer 
not to affiliate only if Mj affiliates. Economists would use the hawk-dove game (also known as snow-
drifting or chicken game) to describe this special scenario where multiple equilibira co-exist. In our 
research context, both merchants hope for the other to move, but neither does. 
If v  is sufficiently large, M2 would adopt the simple uniform pricing because the cost of the  affiliation 
outweighs the benefit. Under this scenario M1 can still benefit from price discrimination. This finding is 
consistent with the literature stream arguing the advantageous firms should take a more aggressive 
promotion strategy (e.g., Rao 1991). Notably, our work provides a different insight from Dogan et al. 
(2010) who concluded that the equilibrium where only advantageous price-discriminates doesn’t exist. 
What drives this difference is that we allow asymmetric reservation price across segments and generalize 
their assumption that all consumers have identical willingness to pay.  
Conclusion and Future Research 
The primary objective of this paper has been to examine the strategic use of the still-nascent cashback 
affiliate model. By affiliating with the cashback platform, merchants are able to exercise second-degree 
price discrimination to increase profits. Despite the merits from sellers’ perspective, cashback mechanism 
actually hurts consumer surplus and social welfare. Surprisingly enough, consumers as a whole could face 
a higher price after the introduction of cashback shopping. Arguing coordination can be achieved through 
a bargaining process, affiliated partners can make themselves better-off by improving channel efficiency. 
This paper contributes to the literature in many aspects. We explicitly consider the implementation cost 
associated with the underlying promotional vehicles. In addition, we endogenizes the product prices as a 
decision variable into merchants’ profit function. These analytical advantages allows us to obtain more 
precise insights into the attractiveness of the cashback model. This unique feature distinguishes our work 
from prior literature in promotions and channel control (e.g., Chiang et al. 2003). Our analytical 
framework is simple; yet, it can be generalized to other commission-based approaches. 
This paper makes a few assumptions. First, the seller in our model face a linear marginal revenue curve 
based on the linearity of demand. However, none of our analyses are dependent of this assumption. One 
should expect, for example, the impact of double marginalization would be more severe if the marginal 
revenue curve is convex. Second, we assume that the consumers’ sensitivity to horizontal differentiation 
(as represented by t) is the same across segments. It could be case that type-h consumers appreciate 
product attributes more than those of the other type. In fact, our results do not change significantly if we 
consider such specification. Intuitively, if th > tl, a monopoly would have higher incentive to price-
discriminate, making our analysis on affiliate decision conservative. In a duopoly setting, the merchant 
with lower brand valuation would benefit more from cashback marketing. Lastly, for the sake of model 
tractability we assume the transaction costs incurred in cashback shopping are discrete cross segments, 
since without this assumption the sellers’ profit will be a cubic function and the equilibrium solution will 
turn out to be messy. Our analytical framework should give a similar result even if we release this 
assumption by allowing ch to be continuous, with cl still being equal to zero since cashback shoppers value 
savings more than time cost (Swan 2010). We should expect that the merchant’s affiliate decision will 
depend on the tradeoff between additional demand generated by type-h segment and lower margin per 
unit sold.  
Future research could investigate the change of optimal profit-sharing scheme when multiple cashback 
sites are involved. In reality, a merchant does affiliate with multiple cashback platforms at the same time. 
The observation points out a series of new questions. Is multi-homing strategy more beneficial to a 
merchant? If so, how does multi-homing strategy influence the competition among merchants and how do 
platforms compete with each other? Moreover, network externality is one of key components to depict the 
nature of platform. Previous literature concludes that platforms fight for a penny to survive. However, we 
wonder whether or not the conventional intuition still holds when the cashback concept comes into play. 
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